

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 EA-11 NEA-14 IO-14 ISO-00 AEC-11

CIAE-00 H-03 INR-11 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-04 OMB-01 PA-04

PM-07 PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-03 SS-20 USIA-15

TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-07 SCI-06 FEA-02 DODE-00 NSCE-00

DRC-01 /186 W

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R 150843Z JUL 74

FM USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4732

INFO AEC GERMANTOWN

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

USMISSION GENEVA

USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L IAEA VIENNA 6250

DISTO

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, TECH, IAEA, JA, US

SUBJECT: JAPANESE VIEWS ON THE NPT

REF: TOKYO 8528, TOKYO 8952

1. JAPANESE AMBASSADOR FUJIYAMA, RECENTLY RETURNED FROM

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CONSULTATIONS IN TOKYO, GAVE ME A RUNDOWN ON CURRENT

JAPANESE VIEWS WITH RESPECT TO IAEA SAFEGUARDS AND THE NPT. FUJIYAMA'S ASSESSMENT GENERALLY COINCIDED WITH THAT IN REFTELS, NAMELY THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO FORMAL CHANGE IN GOJ POLICY RE ULTIMATE RATIFICATION OF NPT, BUT OPPOSITION IS HARDENING AND A TIMETABLE IS INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO PREDICT. FUJIYAMA DID NOT DISCUSS THE REASONS FOR THESE NEW UNCERTAINTIES AT GREAT LENGTH BUT SIMPLY POINTED OUT THE OBVIOUS IMPACT OF THE INDIAN EXPLOSION, THE SPATE OF NUCLEAR TESTING IN RECENT WEEKS, AND THE PROPOSED US NUCLEAR REACTOR SALES TO NON-NPT PARTIES ISRAEL AND EGYPT.

2. NONETHELESS, FUJIYAMA FELT THAT JAPAN WOULD TAKE STEPS IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO STRENGTHEN ITS NATIONAL SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM INCLUDING THE NECESSARY BUDGET SUPPORT FOR EMPLOYMENT OF A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF SAFEGUARDS INSPECTORS. HE SAID IT WAS NOW PLANNED THAT JAPAN WOULD RESUME TALKS WITH THE IAEA ON THE JAPANESE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT SHORTLY AFTER THE IAEA GENERAL CONFERENCE IN LATE SEPTEMBER.

3. FUJIYAMA HAD A LONG MEETING WITH STA MINISTER MORIYAMA IN WHICH FUJIYAMA SURPRISINGLY DID NOT FIND MORIYAMA AS RABIDLY ANTI-NPT AS HE IS USUALLY CHARACTERIZED. FUJIYAMA FEELS THAT MANY OF MORIYAMA'S APPARENT HARDLINE POSITIONS STEM FROM HIS FRUSTRATION IN HIS RELATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND THE CORRESPONDING LACK OF COMMUNICATION WITH RESPECT TO NPT AND SAFEGUARDS PROBLEMS. FUJIYAMA BELIEVED THAT MORIYAMA WOULD NOW MOVE AHEAD TO AT LEAST PROVIDE MORE SUPPORT FOR THE CREATION OF AN EFFECTIVE NATIONAL SAFEGUARDS SYTEM.

4. FUJIYAMA SAID HE WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO ASK ME WHAT SPECIAL SAFEGUARDS AND PHYSICAL SECURITY PROVISIONS THE US WAS REQUIRING IN ITS COOPERATION AGREEMENTS WITH EGYPT AND ISRAEL. I ANSWERED ALONG LINES OF DEPARTMENT'S PREVIOUS GUIDANCE, TOGETHER WITH CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY. I SUGGESTED THAT MORE CURRENT INFORMATION COULD BE SECURED IN WASHINGTON AFTER THE BILATERAL AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN NEGOTIATED, CONFIDENTIAL

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AND HE AGREED TO INFORM TOKYO TO MAKE INQUIRIES IN WASHINGTON SOME TIME IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

5. COMMENT: IT BECAME CLEAR TO ME IN FOREGOING CONVERSATION THAT ONE OF PRINCIPAL JAPANESE CONCERNS IS TO COVER ITSELF FULLY IN FUTURE JAPANESE RELATIONSHIPS IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD WITH NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES NOT PARTY TO THE NPT. THEY WANT TO ASSURE THAT THEIR

COOPERATIVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH SUCH COUNTRIES WILL BE
SUFFICIENTLY FOOL PROOF TO AVOID ANY UNINTENTIONAL
ASSISTANCE TOWARD NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. FUJIYAMA HAD
THE CANADIAN-INDIAN EXPERIENCE VERY MUCH IN MIND. HE
ALSO ASKED SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ABOUT THE SAFEGUARDS
WHICH APPLIED TO THE US SUPPLIED TARAPUR REACTORS. THE
JAPANESE SEEM GENUINELY CONCERNED TO AVOID CREATING
PROBLEMS FOR THEMSELVES IN THEIR FUTURE NUCLEAR
EXPORTS AND SHARING OF TECHNOLOGY WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.
THEY FEEL THE NEED OF ADVICE, AND I HOPE THAT THE
DEPARTMENT AND AEC CAN PROVIDE IT. PORTER

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